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1. Federalism and subsidiarity in the European context 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), later incorporated in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the concept of ‘subsidiarity’ has become a 
prominent part of the constitutional order of the European Union. Since 
1992, the Commission publishes a report each year on the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity. Also, in the recent debates about the 
Constitutional Treaty, reference has often been made to this principle for 
or against certain proposals how the relations between the Union and the 
Member States should be regulated. Indeed, in a multi-level political 
system like the European Union, it is an issue of crucial importance how 
competences are divided and shared between the different levels of 
government (European, national, regional, communal).   
At least for someone who comes from a federal state like the 
Federal Republic of Germany, it is somewhat surprising that the notion of 
‘federalism’ is not mentioned in this context, and is almost banned from 
the official vocabulary of the EU. For the very same problems of an 
adequate division of responsibilities and powers between the different 
levels of government pose themselves in every federal political system 
(Scharpf 1985).  
It is also somewhat surprising that the notion of ‘subsidiarity’ has been 
adopted instead, because this concept – as it was first used in the Papal 
Encyclical “Quadragesimo anno” of Pope Pius XI (1931) – originally 
referred to the relationship between the individual and the various social 
communities to which individuals belong (family, church, other 
associations). So it can be said to refer primarily to the relationships 
between state and non-state actors, rather than to the relationships 
between different territorial levels of government. 
In essence, the principle of subsidiarity stipulates a social order 
where any activities which can be satisfactorily performed by the 
individuals themselves or by the smaller (primary) communities to which 
they belong should not be transferred to larger and more comprehensive 
communities. And the state is conceived as the most comprehensive 
community. Thus the principle of subsidiarity circumscribes the role of 
individual self-responsibility versus the collective responsibilities of 
smaller or larger communities.  
The regulative idea of subsidiarity, however, has two components (which 
is often overlooked): On the one hand, it aims to protect the individual 
and the smaller communities against unwarranted encroachment by the 
larger (political) communities. On the other hand, it constitutes an 
obligation on the part of the larger communities to assist and support the 
individual and the smaller communities if and to the extent they cannot THE ‘OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION’ AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY? 
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help themselves. Striking a balance between these two seemingly 
contradictory demands depends largely on how concrete social situations 
are perceived and interpreted. What should be done, for instance, if the 
majority of citizens can perform their tasks reasonably well, while the 
socially weaker members of the community cannot? Who has the right 
(and the power) to decide whether certain tasks are well, at least 
satisfactorily performed or not?  
This general idea of subsidiarity is now being transferred to the 
political sphere, in order to provide guidelines for the division of 
legislative and executive competences between the European Union and 
the Member States. In principle, there are three solutions to this 
problem: certain policy areas can be assigned to the exclusive 
competence of either the Union or the Member States, or the 
competences can be shared between the Union and the Member States. 
(In the German context, exactly these three types of competences can be 
found as legislative provisions in the Basic Law). But which policy areas 
should fall into which category? Can general rules be found which policy 
issues are best dealt with at the Community level or at the national (or 
sub-national) level, respectively? The evidence of a large variety of 
existing patterns that can be found in federal and more centralized 
political systems raises some doubts about the fruitfulness of such 
efforts. 
Here the same ambiguity surrounding the meaning and 
interpretation of the general principle of subsidiarity, when applied to 
concrete social situations, re-appears on the scene. What to do, if some 
Member States – according to their own judgment or to the judgment of 
Community institutions – perform their tasks well, while others don’t and 
eventually call for assistance by the Community? The situation becomes 
even more complicated when we distinguish between the formulation of 
policy goals and the implementation of policies and consider the 
possibility that these two tasks may be performed at different levels. 
While we believe that the principle of subsidiarity plays a valuable 
role in the political discourse as a regulative idea, we are less convinced 
that it can provide clear-cut (analytical, technical) solutions to the 
problems of an optimal allocation of responsibilities among different 
levels of government. For the economists, this is mainly, if not 
exclusively, a question of economic efficiency. For a political or social 
scientist, however, more is at stake: namely the legitimacy of a political 
system and its acceptance by the citizens. In the final analysis, it 
therefore remains a matter of political assessment how the balance is 
struck, taking proper account of national traditions, but also of changing 
socioeconomic conditions in the contemporary world. From a political and 4   JÜRGEN KOHL  AND TOBIAS VAHLPAHL 
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sociological viewpoint, it is important to recognize that this is not a “once 
and forever” decision based on some abstract logic, but is bound to be a 
dynamic balance subject to changes in social conditions as well as in 
socio-political consciousness. 
As has been stated by the Commission, “in a multi-level system, 
the real challenge is establishing clear rules for how competence is 
shared – not separated” (2001c: 35). It is in this context that the “Open 
Method of Coordination” has been designed and developed as a device for 
sharing responsibilities between the European Union and the Member 
States in some core areas of economic and social policy. 
2. The development of the Open Method of 
Coordination 
The first part of this section shows the typical procedure of the 
OMC as it is used in its different applications. Next, a short historical 
overview of the development of the OMC is given. Then the areas of 
application of the OMC will be described under certain analytical aspects, 
and finally we will try to characterise the OMC in relation to other forms 
of European Governance.  
To characterise the development of the different OMCs in a more 
analytical way, we stress their varying distance to the issue of economic 
integration. It should thus become clear that those policy fields where the 
use of the OMC has been adopted later are less and less closely 
connected with the Common Market. 
2.1 The Procedure of the OMC 
The OMC as a relatively young instrument of policy coordination in the EU 
is applied in a number of different fields. Taking account of this diversity 
of policies, the procedure of the OMC is not exactly the same in every 
case. Despite this fact, certain common elements and principles can be 
identified. These are shown in Figure 1. THE ‘OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION’ AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY? 
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The European Council in Lisbon defined the OMC procedure as follows: 
 
Implementation of the strategic goal will be facilitated by applying 
a new open method of coordination as the means of spreading 
best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main 
EU goals. This method, which is designed to help Member States 
to progressively develop their own policies, involves: 
 
-  fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific 
timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, 
medium and long terms; 
-  establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative 
indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and 
tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as 
a means of comparing best practice; 
Figure 1: The policy cycle of the 'Open Method of Coordination'
EU Council
EU Commission Member States
European Parliament
(and related committees)
elaborates proposals
for guidelines
decides on
guidelines
consults
develop
National Action Plans
report annually on
the implementation
evaluates implementation
and reports on results
Source: Adopted from Schmid (2004)
Figure 1: The policy cycle of the 'Open Method of Coordination'
EU Council
EU Commission Member States
European Parliament
(and related committees)
elaborates proposals
for guidelines
decides on
guidelines
consults
develop
National Action Plans
report annually on
the implementation
evaluates implementation
and reports on results
Source: Adopted from Schmid (2004)6   JÜRGEN KOHL  AND TOBIAS VAHLPAHL 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona"  62/2005 
-  translating these European guidelines into national and 
regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting 
measures, taking into account national and regional 
differences; 
-  periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as 
mutual learning processes. 
 
(European Council 2000a: point 37). 
 
In other words, the basic structure of the OMC is to define goals at the 
level of the Council of the European Union, on a mandate by the 
European Council and following proposals of the Commission, which are 
to be pursued by the respective national governments within their own 
responsibility. These goals are formulated in relatively general terms, 
which is easily understandable if one considers that on this level the 
consensus needed for reaching an agreement is highest (Scharpf 2002a).  
As a next step, these goals set by the Council are translated into a 
system of indicators, which should allow an accurate evaluation of the 
performance of the Member States concerning the common objectives. 
After the evaluation of the national status quo, National Action Plans are 
to be submitted by national governments, which specify by which 
instruments and within which time-frame the goals should be 
accomplished. The Commission, as a central information and coordination 
centre within this process, collects and systematizes the information 
about national strategies and their outcomes. This feed-back process of 
the OMC provides that the Council may issue recommendations to the 
national governments how to improve the policy performance, if 
shortcomings in the goal achievement are revealed by the evaluation 
process. 
In almost all cases, no strict sanctions are intended to penalize a 
violation of these recommendations. Rather it is left to the Member 
States to choose measures deemed suitable (the recommended ones or 
others in each individual case) in the context of their respective 
possibilities. The expected integration effect is supposed to result 
primarily from the information and learning process regarding different 
strategies and their success, and not from explicit legislation from above. 
2.2 Historical Development 
With respect to the development of the OMC, three important dates are 
to be mentioned: 
 
•  1997:  Treaty of Amsterdam THE ‘OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION’ AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY? 
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•  2000:  European Council meeting in Lisbon 
•  2001:  European Council meeting in Laeken 
 
With the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the European Employment 
Strategy (EES) as well as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were 
integrated into the common legal basis of the European Union, 
respectively the European Community. On the one hand, the goals of this 
strategy were a stronger economic cohesion between the participants of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) and a more stable currency. This 
should be achieved through the SGP. On the other hand, the EES should 
help to complement the economic integration with a stronger focus on 
social issues, as well as to face the common problems of growing 
unemployment in the Member States. 
Although the procedure of the SGP is not explicitly defined as such, it 
resembles in its arrangements that of the OMC within the policy areas of 
employment, social inclusion and pensions. Common goals are specified, 
translated into indicators and the goal attainment examined regularly. 
One special characteristic of the SGP is that here a sanction mechanism is 
provided, in case that one or more Member States fail to achieve the 
common goals. Such a sanction mechanism is usually not part of the OMC 
in the other policy areas. 
Here, above all, those applications of the OMC will be dealt with, 
where explicit reference is made to OMC and which are part of the 
common social policy. So the SGP is not further discussed here. The 
strongest focus will be on the EES, because the OMC in this field is the 
most firmly established and developed case so far. So we can learn most 
about the results and consequences of this method here. In other fields 
the OMC is still in its starting phase, and we have to wait for further 
empirical evidence before we can reach a deeper understanding and 
conclusions. This is especially true for health care policy. 
After the implementation of the EES, the next policy area where the 
OMC came to be applied was the strategy to fight poverty and social 
exclusion, launched at the summit meeting of Lisbon in 2000. And finally, 
at the Laeken summit meeting in 2001, pensions and health care were 
selected as the fields, where the OMC should also be applied. Except for 
health care policy, we can examine at least the first steps in the process 
of coordination to the present day. 8   JÜRGEN KOHL  AND TOBIAS VAHLPAHL 
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Figure 2: Steps in applying the 'Open Method of Coordination'
Employment Strategy
Stability and Growth Pact
Social 
Inclusion
Old Age Security
Health Care
(initially)
1997
Amsterdam/
Luxembourg
1998 1999 2000
Lisbon
2001
Laeken
Figure 2: Steps in applying the 'Open Method of Coordination'
 
 
The European Employment Strategy 
The first two applications of the OMC (SGP and EES) are very 
closely connected with the goals of the economic integration and the 
creation of the Common Market. The EES can be seen as a first step to an 
active labour market policy of the Union
1, which partly became necessary 
because of the market failures caused by the economic integration 
process itself. Of similar importance were the political motivations for 
cooperation, caused by the commonality of the problems of continuous 
unemployment and the difficulties in financing the social security 
systems, which the governments tried to alleviate by improving the 
employment situation in the entire community. We can see the transfer 
of employment policy into the European arena as a typical case of spill-
over that is caused by the economic integration. 
In June 1997, the EES was launched in the treaty of Amsterdam 
and concretised at the special European Council conference on 
                                                 
1  Neither the goals of the OMC, nor the execution are carried out by the community organs 
alone, but the goal definition takes place particularly within and between European bodies 
(Commission, Council and European Council). For this reason one can speak of a 
Community policy – in contrary to purely intergovernmental agreements. THE ‘OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION’ AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY? 
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employment in November of the same year in Luxembourg. In the year 
2000 it was further developed and integrated into the Lisbon strategy
2. 
This strategy contains the goal to make Europe "[...]the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion." (European Council 2000a: point 4). The central 
empirical target is an average employment level of 70% for the year 
2010. 
The goals of the EES were formulated for the first time in 1997 and 
accepted by the Council
3. Here four goals were emphasised: 
 
-  Improving Employability 
-  Developing Entrepreneurship 
-  Encouraging Adaptability in Business and their Employees 
-  Strengthening the Policies for Equal Opportunities  
 
(Council 1997) 
 
Partly, quantified targets were set for these goals, which should be 
achieved in a certain period of time. For example it was specified: 
“Each Member State will endeavour to increase significantly the 
number of persons benefiting from active measures to improve 
their employability. In order to increase the numbers of 
unemployed who are offered training or any similar measure, it 
will in particular fix a target, in the light of its starting situation, of 
gradually achieving the average of the three most successful 
Member States, and at least 20%.” (Council 1997: 3). 
In the subsequent years until 2003, the goals were extended and 
amended twice. On the one hand, a higher degree of integration of the 
different focal points into an overall strategy was aimed at by the 
introduction of the ‘cross-sectional’ objective of ‘building conditions for 
full employment in a knowledge-based society’ (Council 2001a: 20). And 
on the other hand, in 2003, the Council agreed on a greater 
differentiation of the objectives (extension from four to nine main 
points)
4. 
The annual National Action Plans (NAP’s) and progress reports are 
constantly monitored by the Commission. In cooperation with the 
Council, the Commission issues regular recommendations to the 
                                                 
2  European Council 2000a. 
3  Council 1997 
4  Council 2003 10   JÜRGEN KOHL  AND TOBIAS VAHLPAHL 
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individual Member States, how the common goals could be further and 
better realised. The number of recommendations varies significantly 
depending upon the national level of goal attainment. 
Social Inclusion 
On an initiative of the Commission
5, the strategy against social 
exclusion was accepted on the European Council in Lisbon (2000). This 
field can be seen as a component of the integrated approach of the 
‘Lisbon strategy '. Here the problems of social exclusion are brought 
together with other concerns of social, employment and economic policy, 
in order to take account of the interdependencies between these areas. 
The fight against poverty and social exclusion can still be regarded 
as closely linked to the economic sphere and above all to the Common 
Market. So the strategy on social inclusion is also to a certain extent 
connected with the EES, since it concentrates on the integration of 
disadvantaged persons into the labour market, as well as on 
employability, which is regarded as the key to avoid of social exclusion. 
The goals which the Council suggested in 2000 and which the 
European Council in Nice (Dec 2000) finally approved were: 
 
-  to facilitate participation in employment and access by all to 
the resources, rights, goods and services; 
-  to prevent the risks of exclusion; 
-  to help the most vulnerable; 
-  to mobilise all relevant bodies.  
 
(Council 2000b: 5) 
 
Here, on the one hand, the high importance of the improvement of 
employability becomes visible, but also - particularly in the second and 
fourth goal - the openness of the strategy, which can be understood as 
an integrated approach, that recognizes the interdependencies between 
different policies. This approach goes far beyond past integration efforts 
in the economic sphere and cuts deeply into the field of social policy 
which is formally strictly under national control.  
Until 2003, the OMC in the area of the social inclusion led to two common 
reports concerning the situation in the Member States, which were 
accepted by the Council following suggestions of the Commission (Council 
2001b and Council 2004). These common reports discuss primarily the 
NAPs and also evaluate these regarding the most successful practices. In 
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this policy area, recommendations to individual states have been given 
only to a limited extent so far. These are included in the common reports. 
OMC in the field of pensions 
Already in the year 2001, the application of the OMC in the field of 
pensions was discussed at the meeting of the European Council of 
Stockholm
6. Finally the introduction of the OMC was decided in December 
2001 at the meeting of the European Council in Laeken
7 following a 
suggestion of the Commission concerning the procedure
8. 
Whereas the strategy for the fight against social exclusion is still 
closely connected with the employment situation and thus with the 
economic integration, this is not the case in the field of pensions in such a 
clear way. Indeed, the European Union member states share the same 
problems in old age security systems, caused by an ageing process of the 
national populations and an unfavourable economic development. 
However these difficulties cannot be directly compensated by modifying 
the labour market organization. Rather some substantial questions with 
respect to the organization of the social security systems are raised, 
which are so far explicitly in the competence of the national 
governments. 
At the European Council of Barcelona (2002), the OMC was 
formally adopted for the field of pension policy, however, without setting 
clear targets: 
 
[The European Council] likewise confirms the importance of 
implementing the Social Protection strategy as regards the quality 
and viability of pensions, which supports the reform of pension 
systems, in the framework of the open method of coordination, 
with the aim of safeguarding the capacity of systems to fulfil their 
social objectives, ensuring financial sustainability, and adapting 
their capacity to meet the new needs of society. To fulfil these 
objectives, it considers the common objectives and the working 
method developed with a view to their confirmation by the 
European Council in Barcelona to be very valuable and useful.  
 
(European Council 2002: 48) 
OMC in the field of public health care 
                                                 
6  European Council 2001a 
7  European Council 2001c 
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The OMC in the field of health care is the least developed so far. It 
was mentioned in the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 
Laeken in 2001
9. But only the first steps of implementing the OMC were 
taken so far. The Commission proposed goals for ‘The future of health 
care and care for the elderly: guaranteeing accessibility, quality and 
financial viability’
10, and the Council published a first report on the 
issue
11. It is important to note that in this report an application of the 
OMC is not explicitly mentioned, but only that ‘[...] it would be worthwhile 
to engage in a co-operative exchange in these fields’ (Council 2002b: 4). 
So we have to wait for the further development before we can analyse 
the process of coordination in this area. 
2.3 Classification of the OMCs 
Concerning the different OMCs, a first distinction can be drawn according 
to whether they are codified in the treaties or not. If the application of 
the OMC is written down in the treaties, we can speak of a higher level of 
institutionalisation. This is important because we can consider the 
application of the OMC to a policy field as a step towards deeper 
integration in this area. This interpretation rests on the view of 
integration as a ladder with several stages and ‘steps in between’. From 
this point of view, the application of OMC could be the first step in an 
integration process, which provides the essential basic consensus in 
policy fields where integration seemed not to be possible before.  
Besides the inclusion in the treaties, the OMCs can be differentiated 
according to the following aspects
12: 
 
•  Are there precise goals to be achieved by the OMC? 
•  Are there guidelines, which regulate the process? 
•  Are there National Action Plans (NAP’s) to be prepared? 
•  Are there joint reports to be made? 
•  Are there recommendations in case a country underachieves the 
common goals? 
 
                                                 
9  European Council 2001c 
10 Commission 2001b 
11 Council 2002b 
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Source: Adopted from Sakellaropoulos (2004: 68)
Table 1: Institutionalisation of OMC in different policy areas
+
Action Programs
+
Sanctions
+ +
Recommendations
+ + + +
Joint Reports
+ + + +
National Reports (NAPs)
+
Guidelines
+ + + +
Objectives / Targets
loose + +
Treaty based
Health Pensions Social 
Inclusion
Employ-
ment
Growth and 
Stability Pact
Source: Adopted from Sakellaropoulos (2004: 68)
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The results of this systematisation are shown in Table 1. One can see, 
that the deeper the OMC penetrates into the core of social policy and 
social security, the weaker is the statutory institutionalisation. This is no 
surprise, because pensions and health policy are likely to be the most 
path dependent areas of national welfare policy at all. On the other hand, 
the stability and growth pact and the employment strategy are closely 
linked to the common market and therefore much easier to connect with 
the economic integration project.  
The OMC is applied to policy fields in which supranational 
regulation or even centralisation (‘hard governance’) is not feasible, 
because presumably the necessary political consensus cannot be 
achieved. Another argument against supranational legislation in those 
fields is the path dependency and interconnectedness of social policies, as 
well as the high amount of legitimation national governments derive from 
economic and social politics, because these are relatively easy to 
communicate to the citizens and observable in their results. In addition, 
the level of redistribution is a point which distinguishes these fields from 14   JÜRGEN KOHL  AND TOBIAS VAHLPAHL 
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those open to Europeanisation. It is easier to achieve integration of social 
policy by regulative in contrast to redistributive measures (examples are 
the regulations for safety at workplaces or the social dialogue)
13, or if the 
supranational policy complements national programs (in the case of the 
social and structural funds), without changing national policies in 
substantial degree. In contrast, the fields of social inclusion, pensions, 
health and employment weigh heavy in the national budgets and are 
closely connected with traditional ideas of social justice. These ideas are 
central for the characterisation of different types of welfare states, 
because they shape the volume and structure of redistribution a welfare 
state is willing to allow or to achieve. It is exactly at this point where the 
process of the OMC comes in with the endeavour to reach a transnational 
consensus over the goals and principles of social policy. 
With regard to established typologies of European Governance, the 
OMC could be located between uncoordinated adjustment of national 
policies based on the growing competition between the states, and the 
community method
14. It entails definitively a higher level of integration 
than an uncontrolled process, where the Member States react separately 
to the challenges of the Common Market in order to gain advantages in 
the inter-European competition. But it means less integration than 
binding legislation on the community level (even if the national 
governments still play a vital role in the process of decision-making in the 
multi-level system). The typology suggested by Fritz Scharpf (2002c) 
includes the mode of intergovernmental negotiations between these two 
poles of uncontrolled adjustment (in the sense of lack of supranational 
control) and the community method. This mode comes to use primarily in 
the second and third pillar of the European Union, where supranational 
bodies do not have much power in the political process. But this type 
obviously is not really suitable to describe the OMC, because the power of 
the Commission to define the common goals is much too strong for a 
‘simple’ intergovernmental agreement. 
For a detailed theoretical classification of the OMC, we need to 
gather further knowledge about the results and consequences of this 
method. It is not obvious yet how the definition of common goals and the 
surveillance of the national performance affects national policy- making 
at all. Only then we can tell whether we really need new theoretical types 
of European governance, or whether we can use existing theories to deal 
with this form of European cooperation and coordination.  
                                                 
13 See Majone 1996 
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3. A critical appraisal of the Open Method of 
Coordination 
In evaluating the impact of the OMC as a new ‘soft’ tool of 
European governance, attention is often focussed on the short-term 
effects on national policy-making in the Member States: Has the OMC led 
national governments to adopt policies and courses of action they would 
otherwise not have undertaken? 
Another approach to evaluate the OMC is in terms of policy 
outcomes: Has policy coordination via OMC led to more adequate and 
effective policy responses with regard to the specific problems addressed 
in the various policy fields? In other words: Has it led to improvements in 
policy performance? And has it led (or will it lead) to policy convergence? 
Such questions are difficult to answer for a variety of reasons: 
First, the impact of the OMC may vary between countries. The OMC may 
not have changed policies in more advanced welfare states, but at the 
same time it may have led to significant policy changes in Member States 
where the respective policy area has been less developed. 
Second, results may differ from one policy area to another. The OMC may 
have been applied and implemented more successfully, say, in 
employment policy than in policies to combat social exclusion. 
Third, since the OMC has only been phased in for some years, it is 
probably too early to reach valid conclusions about its lasting impact. In 
particular, since the OMC has been conceived as a political learning 
process, it may have faced difficulties in the introductory phase which 
may be overcome in the longer run. 
More fundamentally, because of the complexity of relationships existing 
in any policy field and the multitude of factors at work, it is extremely 
difficult to establish causal linkages between a single factor (e.g. a policy 
programme) and an aggregate outcome measure (e.g. a reduction in 
unemployment rates). As a rule, such outcomes are the combined effects 
of a variety of factors which are not easy to disentangle. 
Last but not least, the impact of the OMC with regard to policy 
performance depends to a large extent on the adequacy of the policy 
instruments and strategies chosen, and on the implementation process at 
the national level. The mere fact that a consensus about policy goals has 
been reached, does by no means guarantee that the goals themselves 
will be achieved. One should, therefore, distinguish between the 
procedural and the substantive aspects of the OMC. 
In the context of this paper (and the theme of this conference), 
our concern here is clearly with the procedural aspects. Is the OMC an 
adequate and viable mechanism of coordination between national and 16   JÜRGEN KOHL  AND TOBIAS VAHLPAHL 
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European (economic and social) policies? Is it a suitable mechanism to 
achieve policy convergence among EU countries? The answers to these 
questions do not imply that the policies agreed upon are substantively 
correct or the best possible ones. Since, in the final analysis, the OMC is 
a political bargaining process, the outcome will, of course, be shaped by 
the interests and the power resources of the political actors involved. The 
substantive policies as the outcome of the negotiation process are, 
therefore, likely to change when the composition of the decision-making 
bodies will change. It is crucial, however, that the process of the OMC 
provides a rationally structured framework and a set of rules for such 
negotiations, and thereby limits the discretionary power of individual 
national governments. 
Because of the contingency of the substantive policy choices 
(which may be more or less suited to solve the problems), our appraisal 
of the OMC is bound to be an evaluation of potential effects rather than 
the actual consequences of the application of the OMC in one or the other 
policy area. Furthermore, we look to the longer-term effects of the 
institutionalisation of the OMC rather than to the immediate, short-term 
effects of specific policies. 
Methodologically, the evaluation of actual effects requires an 
empirical analysis of specific case studies from which - hopefully – 
generalizing conclusions may be drawn. The evaluation of possible  or 
probable outcomes is of a more hypothetical nature and has to be based 
on assumptions about behavioural consequences of institutional rules. 
Nonetheless, such assumptions can also be inferred from empirical 
knowledge - as analyses following the institutionalist approach have 
demonstrated. Because institutional rules structure the behaviour of 
actors, but do not strictly determine it, it appears useful to spell out the 
potential consequences of certain institutional arrangements in terms of 
(best-case or worst-case) scenarios. 
As a ‘best case scenario’, we can take the blueprint version of the 
OMC, as it is envisaged in the official documents of the EU, as a starting-
point and try to extrapolate the consequences the continued and 
broadened application of the OMC may have on the EU policy-making 
process. 
 
1.  To begin with, the coordination mechanism of OMC presumes a 
political consensus about the goals to be achieved. These goal 
definitions may be vague and, therefore, may not seem to be 
suitable as guidelines for day-to-day political decisions. 
Nevertheless, they will in any case rule out certain courses of 
action (which some governments may have taken otherwise, in THE ‘OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION’ AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY? 
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the absence of such a procedure). This is particularly the case 
when the adoption of the goal definitions does not require 
unanimity and thus cannot be vetoed by any single national 
government. As past experience with the introduction of ‘qualified 
majority voting’ has shown, this has, indeed, facilitated decision-
making in the EU Council and thereby allowed progressive steps 
towards further integration, without imposing undue obligations on 
countries in a minority position. As a rule, ‘package deals’ have 
been negotiated, but the threat of being overruled has facilitated 
to negotiate such compromises. 
2.  Moreover, once a political consensus about the goal definitions 
and policy guidelines has been reached (and has become the basis 
for consequential policy measures), this consensus is likely to last 
even in the case of governmental changes in some Member 
States. That is, such decisions – like other international treaties – 
exert some sort of binding character for successive governments, 
although not in a strictly legal sense. This is not to say that such 
agreements will become irreversible, but the burden of proof that 
certain changes are necessary lies with those actors who want to 
change them. They will have to mobilize the support of their 
colleagues and to convince them that eventual changes in goals 
(not merely in policy instruments!) are, indeed, necessary or at 
least desirable. 
3.  The vagueness of general goal definitions mentioned above is to 
some degree counterbalanced in the procedural arrangements of 
the OMC, because the political consensus about goals sets in 
motion a process by which these general goals will be translated, 
step by step, into operational policy objectives, eventually even 
with quantified targets (‘benchmarks’). No doubt, the definition of 
economic and social indicators which should adequately reflect the 
‘softer’ verbalized goal definitions and allow to monitor accurately 
the change of socioeconomic conditions as well as the 
performance of policies is of paramount importance here. It is a 
task which is intrinsically political - because it involves normative 
decisions about goals. At the same time, it poses an intellectual 
challenge for social scientists - because it calls for the application 
of certain methodological rules (regarding validity and 
comparability of indicators), regardless of the political value 
judgements (which, at this stage, are to be taken as ‘given’). 
This process of operationalization and concretization has a twofold 
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First, it aims at an evaluation of national policies to which degree 
they have been successful, i.e. reached their objectives and 
operational targets. Insofar as the same methodology is applied, it 
also allows a comparative evaluation of diverse national policies. 
Thereby, a process of ‘policy learning’ will be stimulated among 
the Member States which strategies and policies ‘work best’, i.e. 
achieve a higher degree of goal performance. In the longer run, 
such learning from ‘best practices’ elsewhere should lead to an 
improved goal performance in the EU countries in general. 
However, the adoption of ‘best practices’ and their adaptation to 
national circumstances is a very complicated and intricate process 
with many pitfalls (see below). 
  Second, it requires the systematic collection of empirical 
information (mostly statistical data) to monitor the actual 
development of a range of economic and social indicators. Such 
efforts will lead at least to improvements of the ‘informational 
basis’ of policies; moreover, they are likely to lead to a change in 
the  style of political decision-making in the sense that they 
emphasize the rational calculation of resources needed to achieve 
desired outcomes, of means and ends. 
4.  The OMC procedures leave the choice of policy instruments to the 
national governments, in principle at least. In this way, an 
adaptation to institutional settings and administrative practices in 
the respective national political tradition and culture becomes 
possible. Nonetheless, the political autonomy of national 
governments is not unlimited because the policy instruments 
chosen must meet the condition that they are suited to achieve 
some progress towards reaching the goals agreed upon. Of 
course, in the political process controversial assessments of the 
suitability of certain policy instruments may come up, but in any 
case the pro’s and con’s of certain policy proposals have to be 
legitimized with reference to the broader goals. In doing so – and 
this is an important latent function of the OMC –, the goals 
themselves will be confirmed time and again and more firmly 
entrenched in the minds of the political actors. 
5.  Although the OMC arrangements are based on a political 
consensus among national governments (in the EU Council) and 
leave the choice of policy options largely to the discretion of 
national governments, they nonetheless provide an important role 
for the Commission. For it is the task of the Commission to 
elaborate the guidelines for the EU Council decisions, to collect the 
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National Action plans), and to prepare synthesis reports on the 
implementation of these plans, as a basis for further Council 
recommendations. So the Commission oversees the whole process 
and is instrumental in the day-to-day operations; both tasks are 
prerequisites for the political decisions and recommendations to 
take effect. So, the role of the Commission in the EU decision-
making process will, in fact, be strengthened, despite the fact that 
no formal decision-making power is conferred to the Commission. 
It can be expected that the crucial role of the Commission in the 
implementation of OMC will work out in favour of an increased 
consistency of policies, pursued at the national level. Likewise, it 
can be expected that the consultation of the European Parliament 
and its respective committees will also work out in favour of an 
“integrationist” approach in the policy areas concerned. Moreover, 
if the policy areas of employment, of poverty and social inclusion, 
of pensions and health policy, will appear on the agenda of the 
European Parliament more often and the evidence of the 
respective reports will be the subject of debates in parliament, this 
is likely to increase also public awareness of the commonality of 
social problems and policies among EU citizens. 
6.  Last but not least, once a political consensus about policy goals, 
however vaguely defined, has been achieved, this will have a 
lasting effect on the mindsets of the political actors involved, in 
the higher ranks of national governments as well as in the 
Community administration and among the members of the 
European Parliament. This is just what the institutionalist approach 
suggests: The institutional arrangements and rules shape the way 
how emerging political problems are perceived and treated on the 
political agenda. Of course, political debate and controversy about 
desirable solutions to these problems will not disappear from the 
agenda. But it is important to recognize that this debate takes 
place in a framework of a basic consensus that these are relevant 
problems and have to be dealt with at the European level (at least 
in addition to the national level). 
Insofar as the logic and basic procedures of OMC will be extended 
to additional policy areas (a process that can already be observed, 
see above), an increasing number of government officials, 
Eurocrats and policy experts will be trained and ‘socialized’ in this 
way. It remains an open question, however, whether such 
socialization effects will be restricted to members of the European 
political elite, or will be spread also to the national policy arenas. 20   JÜRGEN KOHL  AND TOBIAS VAHLPAHL 
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In a longer term view, such a process may lead to “harmonising 
ideas, visions, conceptions, knowledge and norms of action, in 
order to have policy goals converging towards ‘a common political 
vision’” (Palier 2003: 8). Such a consensus among the political 
elites about relevant policy goals in the field of economic and 
social policy, in turn, will help to give more substance to what is 
often referred to as “the European social model” and, by the same 
token, it will promote the commitment to the European Union as a 
“value community”, i.e. a political community sharing the same 
basic values.  
Against such optimistic views, a lot of caveats have been raised in a more 
pessimistic mood. Most of them call into question the problem-solving 
capacity of the OMC. For instance, it is argued that – in order to reach 
‘verbal’ consensus – goal definitions tend to be so vague that their 
operationalization becomes arbitrary and, hence, the evaluation of policy 
performance almost impossible. National governments will only agree to 
common goal definitions if these are not in conflict with the goals of their 
own national agenda. The National Action Plans will report on legislative 
and administrative changes which would have been undertaken anyway, 
even in the absence of the OMC requirements. National implementation 
and evaluation reports will tend to report ‘success stories’, but hardly any 
failures or shortcomings. 
While we agree that there is a tendency of political actors to 
behave in this way, we also believe that such tendencies can be kept in 
check by appropriate institutional provisions. Above all, the strengthened 
role of the Commission in monitoring and evaluating the policy 
performance of the member countries can serve to counterbalance such 
tendencies. Perhaps the creation of independent evaluation agencies, 
composed of professional policy experts and analysts, who are not 
subject to instructions by national policy-makers, can fulfill the same 
function. 
Other authors criticize that no effective sanction mechanisms are 
provided if national governments fail to meet the targets to which they 
have committed themselves. They point to the violation of the Maastricht 
criteria as a deterrent excample. However, as evaluation research in 
other areas has often shown, providing positive incentives, for example, 
by exposing ‘best practices’, is probably a much better way to influence 
the behaviour of actors than punitive sanctions. This is especially true 
when causal mechanisms are so complex that a single actor (e.g. a 
national government) cannot reasonably be held accountable for an 
unfavourable outcome because he cannot control all the relevant factors. 
For instance, attaining a certain employment rate may be difficult, THE ‘OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION’ AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY? 
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despite massive governmental efforts, because of fluctuations of the 
business cycle, pressures of globalization, demographic effects, etc..  
Other criticisms focus on the shortcomings of the political process 
by which the consensus about policy goals is to be achieved. On the one 
hand, the OMC calls for the participation also of non-governmental actors 
(such as interest groups, social partners, NGO’s) in setting up the 
National Action Plans. While it can be argued that inclusion of such non-
governmental actors is desirable to mobilize support for the political goals 
from within civil society, it is not always recognized that the difficulties of 
achieving consensus will increase with the number of actors involved (and 
their particular interests). This will at least cause delays, if not deadlocks, 
in the decision-making process. If the inclusion of non-governmental 
actors leads to goal formulations and policy recommendations which 
differ from the government’s view, another problem arises: How can a 
government be held accountable for not attaining policy goals to which it 
has not committed itself? 
On the other hand, it is also criticized that consensus-building 
takes place mainly between national governments (represented in the EU 
Council), but largely neglects the European Parliament as the 
democratically legitimized legislative institution of the EU. This would 
make a consensus more difficult because it would give undue weight to 
particular national interests. More legislative competences for the 
European Parliament would make it easier to overcome such obstacles 
arising from diverging national interests.  
While the general issue of the legitimation of EU decision-making (the so-
called “democracy deficit” problem) has to be taken seriously, such 
criticism seems to rest on certain assumptions which can also be called 
into question. For example, it can be argued that the national 
governments are also democratically legitimised and are, therefore, the 
legitimate representatives of the national interests of the constituent 
Member States – whereas the European Parliament is not fully legitimised 
because of the absence of a European demos (which is reflected in the 
fact that, in the election to this parliament, representation is biased in 
favour of the smaller nations, whereby the principle of ‘one man, one 
vote’ is violated). Moreover, a similar question like the one above can be 
asked with regard to the EP: When policy goals would finally be defined 
by the European Parliament, how can then national governments be held 
accountable for the policy results? 
4. Conclusions 
Considering the inherent tensions between ‘supranationality’ on the 
one hand and ‘intergovernmentalism’ on the other which gave rise to the 22   JÜRGEN KOHL  AND TOBIAS VAHLPAHL 
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demand for subsidiarity as an organizing principle for the sharing of 
competences and responsibilities, our conclusions are the following: 
•  The OMC has the major advantage of being a policy instrument which 
does not require the transfer of legal responsibilities from the national 
to the European level. Instead, it builds on a voluntary political 
commitment of the governments of the Member States to coordinate 
their policies (in circumscribed areas), based on a consensus about 
common goals, in order to achieve a greater convergence in policy 
outcomes. 
•  The OMC has the further advantage of being a flexible policy 
instrument which can be extended to more policy areas (provided 
there is a political consensus). It can be pragmatically adapted to 
institutional settings and administrative procedures prevailing in the 
respective countries, as well as to the peculiarities of the various 
policy areas (for instance, with regard to the specificity of objectives, 
the (non-)binding character of its goal formulations, the inclusion of 
non-governmental actors, etc). 
•  The OMC thus provides a good example of a relatively cost-efficient 
regulative policy. The broader goals are defined at the Community 
level, but the governments commit themselves to pursue and 
implement them at the national level. In particular, this method aims 
at achieving a higher degree of policy convergence among EU 
member states, but does not require additional fiscal resources for the 
European Union as such. 
•  Because of the problems arising from the phasing-in and the 
experimentation with OMC procedures, one should not expect 
spectacular substantive results (improvements in policy performance) 
in the short run. But in a longer term perspective, OMC offers the 
prospects of achieving a normative consensus about the goals of EU 
policies and thereby developing a common European identity. 
•  For these reasons, we are cautiously optimistic that the “Open Method 
of Coordination” has the potential to be a suitable instrument for 
implementing the principle of subsidiarity, without losing sight of the 
necessity of achieving more convergence of policies and thereby 
promoting the political integration of the European Union. 
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